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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we address the issue of how the possibility for areements among network operators 
about building joint facilities affects their networks qualities, their profits and social welfare. We 
show that allowing the network operators to build joint facilities can make the network operators 
to increase their network qualities when they decide so simultaneously. When we analyze entry, 
only the incumbent increases his network quality. The main result is that network operators and 
the regulator coincide in thier decisions about how much the network operators should build 
jointly when the network operators decide simultaneously their network qualities. The same result 
arises when we analyze entry and the network operators are sufficiently differentiated. But, if 
there is entry and the network operators are not sufficiently differentiated, a regulator is hended to 
force the network operators to build joint facilities, what is very surprising from the current 
National Regulatory point of vie w. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* I gratefully acknowledge the research supervision of M. Angeles de Frutos, Pedro L. Marín and Tommaso 
Valletti. I would like to thank The Business School of the Imperial College of London for their hospitality while 
part of this research was conducted. The comments from Noemí Navarro, Ramon Xifré and Antonio G. Zaballos 
are very much appreciated. I also thank the Spanish Ministry of Education for financial support grant AP2000-
0847. The usual disclimer applies 
 
                                                                 
1 Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903, Getafe, Spain, Tlf: +34 
91 6249367, Fax: +34916249875, Email: losada @eco.uc3m.es. 
 
1 Introduction
In this paper, we address the issue of how the possibility for agreements
among network operators about building joint facilities affects their networks
qualities, their profits and social welfare.
The following example picks up a situation where these kind of agreements
arise. There are two network operators that enjoy full coverage in a country.
At the same time, they have to decide their network qualities. The latters
can be measured by the average intensity of the signal that consumers have
available within the country. The consumers travel through the country with
high frequency. The average intensity of the signal that consumers perceive
is proportional to the amount of facilities that the network operators build.
Up to now, the network operators can build facilities only on their own.
So, each network operator has to decide non-cooperatively the amount of
facilities they build. But, it is less costly if the network operators can build
some of the facilities jointly. This is because they are avoiding the duplicity
of some costs, e.g. it is more expensive to design two networks instead of
one, and because if we take a given area of the country, it is cheaper to
generate a given intensity with just one big network that to do so with two.
Using the Erlang Formula we can easily see that the cost of the average
intensity is decreasing with respect to the size of their facilities.1 Outside
the telecommunication industry, we can find more examples.2
About the issue we address, we find two opposite points of view. On
one hand, the network operators argue that ”consumers will benefit through
the delivery of faster, more innovative services at lower prices”.3 On the
1The Erlang Formula gives the size of a network such that it is always able to give
service to the consumers of a telecommunication network operator.
2One possible example could be two academic departments that want to hold seminars
independently. They want to invite the same professor for one of their seminars. This
professor lives in USA and the academic departments are in Europe. If each academic
department invites the professor on their own, each academic department has to pay a
return flight ticket from USA to Europe. But, if both academic departments invite him to
give a seminar one day in one of the academic departments and the day after in the other
department, the academic departments have to pay only a return flight ticket from USA
to Europe and a flight ticket within Europe instead of two return tickets from USA to
Europe. Another example is found in the airline industry. In this industry, some airlines
running the same route, e.g. British Airways and Iberia in the route Madrid-London,
share planes. It is cheaper for them to fly a bigger airplane for both airlines passengers
than to fly each airline its own smaller airplane.
3OFTEL (2002): ”O2/T-Mobile 3G infrastructure sharing agreement: case
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other hand, among National Regulatory Boards, we have found a complete
different point of view, for example, OFTEL has expressed his view in these
terms, ”the agreement may facilitate tacit collusion between the two parties
and there may be spill-over effects which weaken competition at the retail
level”.4
So far, the effects of these agreements about building facilities are not
clear on network qualities and prices. Depending on who is asked, we ob-
tain very different answers. The academic literature on telecommunications
neither helps very much. This literature has extensively studied topics like
the Universal Service Obligation with important contributions in Valletti,
Hoerning and Barros (2002), Anton, Vander Wide and Vettas (2002) and
Chone, Flochel and Perrot (2002), or like the role of the interconnection
charges on network competition, examples can be Laffont, Tirole and Rey
(1998) and Armstrong (1998), but only recently it has started dealing with
the topic of investment. So far, the most relevant article about investment
on telecommunications is the paper by Valletti and Cambini (2003). They
study the influence of the interconnection charges on network operators’ in-
vestments. They challenge the profit-neutrality result that comes from the
article by Laffont et al. (1998).5 They show that the incentives to invest
are influenced by the way the interconnection charges are set. When the
quality of a network has an impact on the quantity of calls initiated by their
own consumers, they obtain a result of tacit collusion in a model of two-part
tariffs in the retail market.
Apart from the literature on telecommunications, we find similarities be-
tween our topic and the literature on cooperative R&D. Examples of this
literature are d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Katz (1986). In these
papers, firms decide whether to carry on the research tasks separately or
cooperatively through a joint venture. The main difference between the sce-
nario we study and the cooperative R&D is that ours is more general. We
allow the network operators to build facilities jointly and separately at the
same time. Moreover, we also allow them to decide how much of these facil-
CMP/C1/N.38.370”.
4OFTEL (2002): ”O2/T-Mobile 3G infrastructure sharing agreement: case
CMP/C1/N.38.370”.
5In Laffont et al. (1998), network operators profits do not depend on the interconnec-
tion charges they pay each other if the network operators compete in the retail market
with two-part tariffs.
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ities is built separately and how much is built cooperatively.6
To study our problem, we use a similar model to the one in the article
by Valletti and Cambini (2003), with the important differences that, in our
model, the interconnection charges are fixed and the network operators can
build jointly facilities.7 We study three cases. First, the network opera-
tors are symmetric and they decide their network qualities simultaneously.
Second, similar to the previous one but assuming network operators to be
asymmetric. Their asymmetry is on demand, we consider that consumers
have a higher perceived quality for one of the network operators. Finally, we
allow for entry.
We show that the two opposite points of view about the impact of allowing
the network operators to build facilities jointly may be motivated. Results
depend on the timing of the decisions that the network operators make. If
network operators decide first their qualities and second the amount of fa-
cilities they build jointly, allowing the network operators to build facilities
jointly makes the network operators increases their network qualities. This is
because it becomes ”cheaper” for the network operators to invest on network
quality. The opposite happens when the network operators decide firstly
about the amount of facilities they build jointly and secondly about their
network qualities. When the network operators are symmetric, they can use
the cooperative agreement to neutralize the quality competition. For both
network operators it is not profitable to deviate from the amount they de-
cide to build jointly. Therefore, both network operators agree on choosing
the minimum network quality. If the networks are asymmetric, the ”collu-
sive” agreement is less strong. The best considered network wants the other
network to be as weak as possible while the least preferred network wants to
be a stronger competitor. Both network operators end up investing less than
with the other timing.
When we analyze entry, we show that the incumbent increases his quality
but the entrant does not. The incumbent benefits because it is ”cheaper” for
her to invest, but the entrant always prefers to keep investing the amount
that gives her the minimum network quality.
With respect to the impact on final prices, we find that if the network
6According to Katz (1986):”It is important to recognize that in a more general setting
allowing independent R&D may change the results dramatically.”
7The model that appears in Valletti and Cambini (2003) is the same model as in Laffont
et al. (1998) with the difference that they introduce an investment stage prior to price
competition.
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operators are symmetric, prices of both network operators are the same as
when network operators can only invest on their own. This is so because,
although each network operator chooses different amounts than when they
do not build jointly facilities, they always match each other in the amount
they invest, getting the same network quality. This does not happen when
we analyze the asymmetric and the entry cases. In the asymmetric case,
we have got two possibilities. If network operators decide first the amount
of facilities they build jointly and second their network qualities, when the
best considered network has sufficient bargaining power the best considered
network enjoys a higher price and the worst considered network a lower price.
When we consider entry, the incumbent enjoys a higher price and the entrant
a lower price.
But the most important finding is that the network operators and the
regulator coincide on their decisions about the amount that network opera-
tors should build jointly when the network operators decide simultaneously
their network qualities. This holds for the symmetric and for the asymmetric
case. This result is restricted to the case when network operators decide first
about their network qualities and second about the amount of facilities they
build jointly. In this case, allowing them to build facilities jointly is desirable
from the social point of view. Moreover, we would not need a regulator to
keep guard on the process, because network operators decisions would be also
right for social welfare. The opposite happens when the order of the network
operators decisions is reversed. In such a context, allowing the network op-
erators to build facilities jointly helps them to ”collude” because they build
networks of much lower quality.
Finally, when we analyze entry, if network operators are sufficiently dif-
ferent in the product they offer, their decisions and the regulator decision
about how much the network operators should build jointly coincide. But,
if network operators are not sufficiently different, in the product they offer,
they decide a lower quantity compared to the social optimum. A regulator
could be needed in order to force the network operators to build joint facili-
ties. As we mentioned above, this is an unexpected result from the National
Regulatory Boards point of view.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic
model and we solve for the last stage of the game (price competition). In
section 3, we solve the case with symmetric network operators. In section
4, we solve the case with asymmetric network operators. In section 5, we
analyze entry. In section 6, we conclude.
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2 The Basic Model
2.1 Demand and Cost Structure
We use a model similar to the one used in Valletti and Cambini (2003) with
the differences that in our model interconnection charges are fixed, consumers
demands are inelastic and network operators can build joint facilities.
There are two network operators, A and B, located at the ends, xA = 0
and xB = 1 of a segment [0, 1] that represents a country. Each network
operator competes for the calls of the individuals.
The network operators play a three stages game. At stage one, the net-
work operators decide simultaneously and noncooperatively the infrastruc-
ture levels of their networks. We denote the network operator A infrastruc-
ture level by IA and the network operator B infrastructure level by IB. The
infrastructure levels measure the quality of the networks.8 We suppose that
by regulation there is a minimum infrastructure level denoted by I.
The network operators can build jointly some of the facilities. We as-
sume that there are economies of scale when they build jointly facilities. We
call Is the infrastructure level that each network operator enjoys from the
facilities that they build jointly. This amount can never exceed any of the
infrastructure level decided by the network operators, Is ≤ min{IA, IB}.9
At stage two, the amount of Is is decided either cooperatively by the net-
work operators or by a regulator. At stage three, given the network configu-
ration that arises from previous stages, the network operators simultaneously
and independently choose prices pi, i = A,B, and the network operators get
the final payoffs.10
We assume, for simplicity, that the network operators marginal costs are
0. For the infrastructure level costs, we assume the function Fi(Ii, Is) =
(Ii − γIs)α, α > 1, γ < 1, i = 1, 2.11 Both functions are increasing and
8Following the example of the introduction IA and IB can be interpreted as the aver-
age intensity of the signal available to consumers from each network operator within the
country
9Is ≤ min{IA, IB} reflects the fact that any network operator cannot be forced to build
more facilities jointly that the necessary amount to get the network infrastructure level
that the network operator wants.
10To study our problem deeply, we use other games with the same stages but with
different timings.
11We construct the cost functions for infrastructure level as follows: We consider Ii
as the total network operator i infrastructure level. Then, Ii = ki + Is, where ki is the
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convex with respect to Ii, decreasing with respect to Is and with negative
cross derivative with respect to Ii and Is.
The consumers are a unit mass uniformly located along the segment [0, 1].
We assume that each consumer has a unit demand for calls. When a consumer
located at x in the segment joins a network operator located at xi, he enjoys
a utility given by:
ui(Ii) + v0 − 1
σ
| x− xi | −pi; i = A,B, x ∈ [0, 1]
where v0 is a fixed surplus from subscribing to any network operator.
We assume that v0 is large enough to all consumers connected to a network
operator. The utility that network operators infrastructure level gives to
consumers is u(Ii), (hereafter ui).
12 Any increase in the level of a network
operator infrastructure level gives more utility to his consumers, however the
raise is lower as the level of the network operator infrastructure level is higher.
To be consistent with these assumptions, we assume that ui is increasing and
concave with respect to Ii. Finally σ measures the degree of substitution
among the network operators, i.e. the intensity of price competition.13
We look for the Pure Strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the
game.
2.2 Market Shares
From above, a consumer located at x subscribing to network operator A
enjoys utility:
uA + v0 − 1
σ
x− pA
network operator i infrastructure level build on his own and Is and the part of investment
build jointly. The cost functions for infrastructure level is Fi(ki, Is) = (ki + δIs)α, δ < 1.
Notice that when they build jointly is cheaper because of the economies of scale. From
equation Ii = ki + Is, we know that ki = Ii − Is. If we replace the expression in the costs
functions we obtain a new cost function Fi(Ii, Is) = (Ii− (1− δ)Is)α. If we call γ = 1− δ,
we obtain our cost functions Fi(Ii, Is) = (Ii − γIs)α.
12Notice that the network operators infrastructure level utility, ui, is only a function of
Ii, Is does not appear. This means that we assume that the consumers only care about the
level of infrastructure they enjoy and they do not care at all about how the infrastructures
are built.
13σ is related to the inverse of transport cost, i.e., the notional costs that consumers
pay when they purchase a variety distant from their ideal.
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and if he subscribes to network operator B, he enjoys utility:
uB + v0 − 1
σ
(1− x)− pB
The indifferent consumer is one located at θ such that:
uA + v0 − 1
σ
θ − pA = uB + v0 − 1
σ
(1− θ)− pB
Thus:
θ =
1
2
+ σ(
(uA − uB) + (pB − pA)
2
)
Given that the indifferent consumer is located at θ in the segment and
the localization of the network operators (xA = 0 and xB = 1), the network
operator A market share is θA = θ and the network operator B market share
is θB = 1− θ.
2.3 Price Competition
In this last stage, the infrastructure levels are fixed, hence, the network
operator i has to solve the following maximization problem:
max
pi
Πi = pi(
1
2
+σ(
(ui − uj) + (pj − pi)
2
))−(Ii−γIs)α, for i = A,B and j 6= i
Taking the derivative with respect to pi, we obtain:
∂Πi
∂pi
=
1
2
+ σ(
(ui − uj) + (pj − 2pi)
2
) = 0, i = A,B
From the system of equations, equilibrium prices are:
p∗i =
1
σ
+
(ui − uj)
3
i = A,B
The equilibrium prices reflect the two sources of differentiation in the
industry. First, as the degree of substitution, σ, is lower, both network
operators can charge higher prices. Second, if the network operators enjoy a
different amount of infrastructure level, the network operator with the higher
infrastructure level can charge higher price than his rival.
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3 Infrastructure level: Symmetric Network
Operators
3.1 Social Planner Benchmark
A useful benchmark is given by the infrastructure levels, Ii, and by the
infrastructure level from the facilities that they build jointly, Is, that would
be chosen by a benevolent social planner. A benevolent social planner solves
the following maximization problem:
max
Ii,s
W =
ui + v0
2
− (Ii − γIs)α
s.t. Is ≤ min{Ii, Ij}
As both network operators are symmetric, each network operator serves
half of consumers, furthermore, any consumer enjoys a utility ui + v0 from
consuming from any of both network operators when their infrastructure
level is Ii. Then, the total consumers utility per network operator is (ui +
v0)/2. Both network operators have to pay a cost (Ii − γIs)α to be able to
offer a infrastructure level Ii to their consumers when a part, Is, of their
infrastructure level comes from the facilities that they have built jointly.
It can be checked out that the derivative of W with respect to Is is
positive. This means that the social planner wants Is to be as high as possible,
i.e., Is = min{Ii, Ij}. Once this is clear, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 If the network operators can build facilities jointly, the social
planner optimum is IPs = IP and I
P
i = I
P
j = IP , where Ip solves:
1
2
∂ui
∂Ii
− α(1− γ)αIα−1i = 0
In equilibrium IPs = I
P
i = I
P
j = Ip. We could think that min{Ii, Ij} could
be Ij, and I
P
i > I
P
j . But if we think that the network operators choose the
same amount of infrastructure level when they cannot build jointly facilities
and that the social planner would ask the network operator with min{Ii, Ij}
for a higher infrastructure level to relax the constraint Is ≤ min{Ii, Ij} to
allow the network operators to build jointly more facilities. Then, we would
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find out a situation where IPj > I
P
i . The social planner asks both network
operators to have the same infrastructure level. Moreover, the social planner
wants both network operators to build all their facilities jointly.
With the introduction of the possibility for the network operators of build-
ing jointly facilities, we have found a cheaper way of getting infrastructure
level. Therefore, the social planner just chooses the most efficient way of
building facilities. This brings us to the following result:
Proposition 2 Building facilities jointly is welfare enhancing.
3.2 Infrastructure level competition: The amount of
facilities network operators can build jointly is set
by a regulator
In this subsection, given the equilibrium prices of the last stage of the game
and the decision of the regulator, both network operators decide their infras-
tructure levels. As a benchmark, first, we check the infrastructure level when
the network operators are not allowed to build jointly facilities, Is = 0. In
this case, each network operator has to maximize profits, Π∗i :
max
Ii
Π∗i =
1
2σ
+
(ui − uj)
3
+ σ(
(ui − uj)2
18
)− Iαi
Applying symmetry to the first order condition, the equilibrium invest-
ment satisfies the following condition:
I∗i is Ii ∈ <+ /
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii
− αIα−1i = 0
The infrastructure level that the network operators choose in equilibrium
is far lower from the social optimum infrastructure level.14 With this in
mind, we compare it with the possibility of building jointly facilities and
how it does affect the infrastructure level. First, recall that the constraint
Is ≤ min{IA, IB} becomes in the symmetric case Is ≤ Ii. Depending on
the quantity, Is, set by the regulator, we distinguish two cases: Is < Ii
and Is = Ii. In the first case, the regulator sets a quantity lower than
14The social planner optimum infrastructure level is 12
∂ui
∂Ii
− αIα−1i = 0 higher than the
privately chosen investment 13
∂ui
∂Ii
− αIα−1i = 0.
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the infrastructure level chosen by the network operators, in the second case
the regulator sets a quantity equal to the infrastructure level chosen by the
network operators. In any case we can conclude:
Proposition 3 If the network operators can build joint facilities and a regu-
lator sets the quantity, Is, the network operators choose higher infrastructure
levels than when they cannot build facilities jointly.
The intuition about this result is simple. When the network operators
can build facilities jointly, the marginal cost of building those facilities is
lower due to the economies of scale they get. At the same time, consumers
are not affected by the way the facilities are built but by the quality of
the networks measured by the amount of infrastructure level. Thus, the
marginal revenue does not change while the marginal cost is lower, therefore
the network operators choose higher infrastructure levels for their networks.
We think that allowing the network operators to build jointly facilities
is good from a social point of view, because it yields higher infrastructure
levels. But, a question that we have not answered yet is the quantity that
the regulator should set to reach the closest infrastructure level to the social
planner optimum level. This quantity is Is = min{Ii, Ij}, as we claim in the
following result:
Proposition 4 The regulator optimum choice is Is = min{Ii, Ij}. The net-
work operators always choose a lower infrastructure levels compared with the
social planner optimum for any Is.
Because the network operators marginal cost of infrastructure levels de-
crease with the possibility of building facilities jointly, the network operators
end up choosing higher infrastructure levels. This is, in general, very con-
venient, because we can improve the social welfare. As the social welfare
increases as Is is higher, then, the regulator should choose Is = min{Ii, Ij}
to get the highest possible social welfare.
In this case, improving the social welfare does not mean that we are
closer to the social planner optimum. This is so because the possibility for
the network operators of building jointly infrastructures also makes higher
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the social planner optimum infrastructure level. The social planner internal-
izes the lower marginal cost of the infrastructure level in the same way as the
network operators do.15 The marginal revenue functions remain constant for
the social planner and for both network operators. If we pay attention, we
can see that the marginal revenue is always greater for the social planner in
constant proportion. This means that the proportions between the network
operators optimum infrastructure level and the social planner optimum re-
mains constant, which means that the difference between both optima are
greater.
We also should be concerned about how building jointly facilities affects
the network operators profits. At first sight, the answer is not very clear. On
one hand, it is ”cheaper” for the network operators to get infrastructure levels
due to the economies of scale from building jointly facilities. On the other
hand, as the marginal cost of infrastructure level is lower, they also choose
higher infrastructure levels. We have two opposite effects and depending on
the winning effect, the network operators make higher or lower profit. In the
next proposition we have the solution to this trade-off:
Proposition 5 If network operators are allowed to build facilities jointly and
the regulator sets the quantity they can build jointly, Is, the network operators
enjoy higher profits.
Finally, the network operators make more profit when they can build
facilities jointly. Although, in equilibrium, they choose higher infrastructure
levels because the marginal cost of investing is lower, the savings due to the
economies of scale are higher. The reason why this occurs lies in the concavity
of the consumers utility function. Given that marginal utility is decreasing, it
is not worthy for the network operators to expand their infrastructure levels
very much.
From the analysis made up to now, we can conclude that allowing the
network operators to build jointly facilities when the quantity to be built
jointly is set by a regulator is welfare enhancing and, furthermore, makes the
network operators profits higher.
15If we check out the social planner problem and the network operators problem, we see
that they have got the same infrastructure level cost functions (Ii − γs)α and therefore
the same infrastructure level marginal cost function
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3.3 Infrastructure level competition: The network op-
erators decide the amount of facilities to be built
jointly
We analyze the situation where network operators can build jointly facilities
and they also decide cooperatively about so.16 In order to do so, we propose
the model of the previous subsection with the difference that the amount of
facilities that the network operators build jointly is decided cooperatively by
bargaining among themselves.
We use a game where at the first stage the network operators choose non-
cooperatively their networks infrastructure levels, Ii. At the second stage
they decide through bargaining the amount of facilities they build jointly.
As before, we represent it by Is, the infrastructure level that each network
operator enjoys from the infrastructure they build jointly. At the last stage,
the network operators decide non-cooperatively their prices and final payoffs
are realized.
For the cooperative stage, the network operators play a Bargaining Game,
where the network operators build nothing jointly as the disagreement point,
Is = 0.
The last stage, where the network operators decide their prices, is iden-
tical to the case where a regulator decides the amount of facilities that the
network operators can build jointly.
Following backward induction procedure, we continue solving the bargain-
ing stage by means of the Nash Bargaining Solution. We solve the following
problem:
max
Is
ΠβAΠ
1−β
B
s.t. Is ≤ min{IA, IB}, β ∈ (0, 1)
where
ΠA =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
16As we have shown in the introduction, National Regulatory Boards as OFTEL, warn
about possible damages in competition when network operators build jointly facilities and
they decide cooperatively about so.
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and
ΠB =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
From the maximization problem above, we can conclude:
Lemma 1 The Nash Bargaining Solution at the Bargaining Stage is Is =
min{IA, IB} or Is = 0.
The network operators find that any increase in Is reduces the marginal
cost of the infrastructure levels. Then, it seems that the solution is Is =
min{IA, IB} conditional on the fact that the disagreement status quo is not
preferred by any of the network operators. Otherwise, the solution would be
Is = 0.
Once we have got the possible solutions to the Bargaining Problem, we
can solve the last stage of the game. In this stage, the network operators
decide non-cooperatively their infrastructure levels. Both firms have to solve
the following maximization problems:
max
Ii
Π∗i =
1
2σ
+
(ui − uj)
3
+ σ
(ui − uj)2
18
− (Ii − γIs)α, i = A,B, j 6= i
s.t. Is = min{IA, IB} or Is = 0
The reader should note that this problem is identical to the problem
we have solved when we have analyzed the case where a regulator sets the
quantity they could build jointly. The only difference now is that Is can be
0 or min{IA, IB}.
Proposition 6 In a SPNE, network operators choose an infrastructure level
identical to the case where a regulator sets the amount of facilities that they
can build jointly.
We should point out that a key feature for this result is that the network
operators make more profits when Is = min{IA, IB} than when Is = 0. This
is so, because although they choose a higher infrastructure level, the cost
savings due to amount of facilities that they build jointly is far higher than
the costs due to the higher infrastructure level. Once this point is clear,
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the intuition about the result is rather the same than in the case where a
regulator sets the amount of facilities that the network operator can build
jointly.
This result shows a very important feature in this context, it is the same
that a regulator chooses the amount of facilities that the network operators
can build jointly, as this amount is chosen by the network operators coopera-
tively. Then, we can conclude that a regulator is not required to keep guard
the network operators election of Is. This is a very good result, because we
are avoiding the possible distortions of the regulation.17
We move to check the robustness of the last result to games with a dif-
ferent timing. We consider two new types of game. In the first type, the
network operators, at the first stage, decide cooperatively the amount they
build jointly. At the second stage, the network operators decide their infras-
tructure levels. Finally, they decide non-cooperatively their final prices.
In the second type of game, at first stage, simultaneously, they decide
cooperatively the amount they build jointly and non-cooperatively their in-
frastructure levels. Finally, again, they decide non-cooperatively their final
prices.
If we solve these games and we compare them among themselves and with
the previous game, we see that:
Proposition 7 Let network operators choose simultaneously their infras-
tructure levels and the amount of facilities they build jointly. Then, the
results are identical to the previous scenario analyzed. On the other hand, let
network operators decide first the amount of facilities they build jointly and
afterwards their infrastructure levels. Then, they underinvest by choosing the
minimum infrastructure levels, I∗i = I
∗
j = I.
This result shows that the timing of the decisions matters. Depending on
the timing, we have two complete different results. On one hand, we have
got that the network operators choose the right decisions from a social point
of view, but on the other hand, if the network operators choose first the
amount of facilities they build jointly, they have an incentive to ”collude”
setting networks with the minimum quality requirements I. This ”collusion”
agreement comes from the fact that the network operators know from the
17These distortions mostly come from the regulator lack of information about the net-
work operators. See Laffont and Tirole ”A theory of incentives in procurement and Regu-
lation” for a deep discussion.
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bargaining process that they will build all the facilities jointly and they will
not build anything on their own. Given this, the best they can do is to build
facilities with the minimum quality.
From the results obtained up to now, we can conclude that the National
Regulatory Boards should allow the network operators to build facilities
jointly. But, they should control the timing of the network operators de-
cisions, giving no room to the possible ”collusion”.18
4 Infrastructure levels: Asymmetric Network
Operators
4.1 Infrastructure level competition: the amount of fa-
cilities that the network operators can build jointly
is set by a regulator
We consider the same model than before but with an important difference.
We propose an asymmetry that comes from the demand side. We assume
that one of the network operators, for example the network operator A, gives
more utility to consumers when both network operators have chosen the
same infrastructure level.19 In our model, this assumption is represented by
uA(τA, IA) = τAu(IA) and uB(τB, IB) = τBu(IB) (hereafter ui(τi, Ii) = ui),
where τA > τB > 0 and u(Ii) = 0 if Ii = 0, i = A,B.
20
First we check the infrastructure levels when the network operators are
not allowed to build jointly facilities. Given equilibrium prices of the last
18There is another option for the National Regulatory Boards. This is that the National
Regulator Boards directly set Is, the amount of facilities that they can build jointly. But,
this option can be seen as too intrusive. Again problems of information. See footnote 17.
19Our new model can help us to understand investment behavior in the past, when the
first duopolies were set up in the mobile telephony. In these cases, one of the network
operators almost always was owned by the incumbent of the fixed telephony while the
other network operator came from firms not very well known by consumers. This better
knowledge by consumers from the network operators owned by the incumbents of the fixed
telephony was and is still and advantage for these network operators because consumers
have a perceived quality for them.
20A similar setting is used in the paper by Carter and Wright (1999) where they study
the influence of the brand loyalty on the competition among network operators. The most
important difference with this paper is that the network operators do not take decisions
about the investments on their networks.
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stage of the game, the network operator A has to maximize profits, Π∗A:
max
IA
Π∗A =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ(
(uA − uB)2
18
)− IαA
The network operator B also maximizes profits, Π∗B:
max
IB
Π∗B =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ(
(uA − uB)2
18
)− IαB
As uA > uB ∀IA = IB, in equilibrium, both network operators cannot enjoy
the same infrastructure level.21 The remaining question is who chooses a
higher infrastructure level. We give the solution in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Let network operators be not allowed to build joint facilities. In
equilibrium, I∗A > I
∗
B.
The network operator A chooses a higher infrastructure level than the
network operator B for three reasons. Firstly, the network operator A enjoys
more direct marginal revenue from its infrastructure level, measured by 1
3
∂uA
∂IA
,
than the network operator B, 1
3
∂uB
∂IB
. 22 Secondly, the marginal cost functions
are equal for both network operators. And lastly, the network operators have
incentives to be differentiated in the levels of investment they choose, this
effect is measured by the indirect marginal revenues:
σ
9
(ui − uj)∂ui
∂Ii
These indirect marginal revenues induce to choose a higher infrastructure
level to the network operator A and lower to the network operator B. This
last effect is milder when the degree of differentiation, σ, is lower.
Once we have seen what happens with the network operator infrastructure
levels when they are not allowed to build jointly facilities, we can move
to check how the network operator infrastructure levels are affected by the
possibility for the network operators of building jointly facilities.
21If we check the first order conditions, we can conclude that both equations cannot be
0 at the same time when IA = IB .
22uA > uB ,∀IA = IB and ui = 0 if Ii = 0 ⇒ ∂uA∂IA > ∂uB∂uB ∀IA = IB .
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Before starting the analysis, note that the previous restriction Is ≤ min{IA, IB}
is present in this case too.
As in the symmetric case, the regulator sets Is to the maximum possible
amount Is = min{IA, IB}, because for the regulator Is is just a cost saving
factor.23 The network operators solve the following maximization problems:
max
IA
Π∗A =
1
2σ
+
uA − uB
3
+ σ(
(uA − uB)2
18
)− (IA − γIs)α
s.t. Is ≤ min{IA, IB},
for the network operator A, and for the network operator B:
max
IB
Π∗B =
1
2σ
+
uB − uA
3
+ σ(
(uA − uB)2
18
)− (IB − γIs)α
s.t. Is ≤ min{IA, IB}
Notice that in equilibrium min{IA, IB} = IB. As both network operators
have the same cost function and network operator A is still preferred by
consumers, IB cannot be higher than IA in equilibrium. Given this fact and
the maximization problems, we can conclude:
Proposition 8 When network operators can build jointly facilities and a
regulator sets the quantity that they can build jointly, the network operators
choose higher infrastructure levels for their networks.
The reasons for the raising of both network operators infrastructure levels
are the same as in the symmetric case. If the network operators can build
jointly facilities, they get lower marginal costs for the infrastructure levels
while the marginal revenue remains constant. That means that both network
23In the planner problem, Is only appears in the cost function that is represented by
MSA(IA − γIs)α +MSB(IB − γIs)α, where MSA and MSB are the network operator
A and B market shares. Given this, it is straight forward to see that the social planner
wants Is to be as high as possible.
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operators increase their infrastructure levels compared to the case where they
can build facilities only on their own.
Again, allowing the network operators to build jointly facilities is welfare
enhancing because the infrastructure levels increase.
Another important remaining issue is how the possibility of building
jointly affects the existing gap between the two network operators equilib-
rium infrastructure levels, I∗A > I
∗
B. We answer this question in the following
proposition:
Proposition 9 Let be I∗A, I
∗
B, respectively, the network operator A and B
equilibrium infrastructure levels when they do not build jointly facilities and
let be I∗∗A , I
∗∗
B are the equilibrium infrastructure when they do, then:
I∗A − I∗B > I∗∗A − I∗∗B ∀α ≥ 2
This means that when the regulator sets a quantity Is, the network oper-
ator B infrastructure level, IB, follows a process of catch-up of the network
operator A infrastructure level, IA. This is because the network operator B
infrastructure level binds the amount of facilities that the network operators
can build jointly. This gives to network operator B an extra incentive to
choose a much higher infrastructure level. In terms of the impact of Is on
prices, as the infrastructure level gap is closer, the network operators prod-
ucts are more homogeneous and therefore the prices also get closer. The
network operator A enjoys a lower price and viceversa for the network oper-
ator B.
Apart from what happens to prices, allowing operators to build jointly fa-
cility is consumer surplus enhancing for two reasons: both network operators
consumers enjoy more infrastructure levels and because the utility gain from
the network operator A price drop can never be overcome by the network
operator B price increase.24
24The competition between the network operators make impossible for them to appro-
priate the new surplus via prices.
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4.2 Infrastructure level competition: The network op-
erators decide the amount of facilities to be built
jointly
As we have made in the symmetric case, we consider the case where Is is
decided cooperatively by the network operators. Again, we are concerned
about how the decision about Is may damage the competition among the
network operators.
We use the same model we have used in the symmetric case when the net-
work operators also decide about the amount of facilities they build jointly,
but we introduce the same asymmetry on demand as when a regulator de-
cides about Is. We assume that one of network operators, network opera-
tor A, gives more utility to consumers when both network operators have
the same infrastructure level. Recall that, uA(τA, IA) = τAu(IA) = uA
and uB(τB, IB) = τBu(IB) = uB where τA > τB > 0 and u(Ii) = 0 if
Ii = 0, i = A,B.
Again at the last stage, where the network operators decide their prices,
this case is identical to the one where there is a regulator deciding the amount
of facilities that the network operators can build jointly.
Following backward induction procedure, we continue solving the second
stage of the first game, assuming that they agree on the Nash Bargaining
Solution. We compute it solving the following problem:
max
Is
ΠβAΠ
1−β
B
s.t. Is ≤ min{IA, IB}, β ∈ (0, 1), uA > uB ∀IA = IB 6= 0,
where
ΠA =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
and
ΠB =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
The solution is the same that in the symmetric case, either Is = min{IA, IB}
or Is = 0. In principle, both network operators want the amount of facilities
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that they build jointly to be as high as possible. The reason is that any in-
crease in Is reduces the marginal costs of the infrastructure levels. It seems
that the solution is Is = min{IA, IB}, but it could happen that the network
operators choose the disagreement point, in that case, the solution would be
Is = 0.
With this result, we can solve the first stage of the game. In this first
stage, the network operators decide non-cooperatively their infrastructure
levels. They solve:
max
IA
Π∗A =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
s.t. Is = min{IA, IB} or Is = 0
uA > uB if IA = IB 6= 0
for the network operator A. For the network operator B:
max
IB
Π∗B =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
s.t. Is = min{IA, IB} or Is = 0
uA > uB if IA = IB 6= 0
If we compare these maximization problems with the maximization prob-
lems where there is a regulator, we see that they are basically identical with
the difference that now the network operators can also choose Is = 0, the
disagreement point. But, no network operator is interested in choosing the
disagreement point, because, although allowing the network operators to
build jointly facilities increases the infrastructure levels (which may suppose
a loss in profit via lower revenue for the network operator A) and more
cost, nevertheless, the cost savings, due to the economies of scale, are much
higher. The network operators end up with higher profits. Given this, we
can conclude:
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Proposition 10 Let network operators decide first about their infrastructure
levels and second they decide cooperatively the amount of facilities they build
jointly. Then, they choose the same amount of infrastructure levels as when
the amount of facilities they build jointly is decided by a regulator.
The regulator and the network operators choose the same. This is impor-
tant because if the network operators follow this timing on their decisions,
we do not need to apply any regulation to this industry.
To check the robustness of this result with respect to the timing of the
game, we solve the other two games we have proposed before, when we have
analyzed the situation with symmetric network operators. If we compare the
results obtained with the results obtained in the previous game, we can see
that:
Proposition 11 Let network operators choose simultaneously their decisions
about their infrastructure levels and the amount of facilities they build jointly.
Then, the results are identical to the previous scenario analyzed. Let network
operators decide, first, about the amount of facilities they build jointly and
afterwards decide their infrastructure levels. Then, in this case, both network
operators choose a lower infrastructure level.
Again, the timing of the decisions matters. Although the differences in
the results about the infrastructure levels is not so large as it was in the
symmetric case.25
In this case, we find that the best considered network operator forces
the other network operator to choose a lower infrastructure level. The best
considered network operator agrees in building jointly the maximum possible
amount of infrastructures but in exchange for it, the worst considered network
has to lower his infrastructure level. With this action, the best considered
network operator gets a weaker competitor. With it, the best considered
network operator does not need to invest in his network as much as he does
in the other cases.
From the last result, we can conclude that the National Regulatory Boards
should allow the network operators to build facilities jointly. But, they should
control the timing of the network operators decisions to force them to choose
the infrastructure levels as high as possible.26
25Recall that in the symmetric case, when the network operators chose first the amount
of facilities they build jointly and second their infrastructure level, they chose the minimum
infrastructure level, I.
26Idem footnote 18.
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5 Entry
5.1 Infrastructure level competition: The amount of
facilities that the network operators can build jointly
is set by a regulator
In order to analyze entry, we now study the symmetric model with the dif-
ference that the network operators take their infrastructure level decisions
sequentially.27 We assume that the network operator A is the incumbent and
is, therefore, the first to choose infrastructure level and the network operator
B is the entrant and the second to choose infrastructure level. Our aim is
to know how both network operator invest under the possibility of building
jointly facilities and compare it with the case where no facilities can be built
jointly.28 As in the previous subsections, we start looking at what happens
when the network operators are not allowed to build jointly facilities. The
entrant has to solve the following maximization problem:
max
IB
Π∗B =
1
2σ
+
uB − uA
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− IαB
If we take the derivative with respect to IB we obtain the entrant reaction
function:
∂Π∗B
∂IB
=
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− αIα−1B = 0
Following the backward induction procedure, we set up the incumbent
maximization problem, given the network operator B reaction function:
max
IA
Π∗A =
1
2σ
+
uA − uB
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− IαA
s.t.
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− αIα−1B = 0
From these maximization problems, we derive the following result:
27The paper by Henkel (2002) proves that this is a very good setting to analyze entry,
because the infrastructure level are strategic substitute and therefore, there is not problems
of commitment on the decision made by the incumbent.
28In this case, for entry, we describe a situation where the entrant has already taken his
decision of entry but he has to take all the rest of decisions, in our case, decisions as his
infrastructure level or his retail prices
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Lemma 3 When the network operators decide sequentially their infrastruc-
ture level, the incumbent chooses a higher infrastructure level than the en-
trant, I∗A > I
∗
B. Moreover, the entrant chooses the minimum infrastructure
level I that a network operator has to supply.
From this result, we can see that the incumbent profits from his first-
mover advantage to get the best position in the market. When the entrant
has to decide his infrastructure level, he sees that the only profitable possi-
bility is to choose a lower infrastructure level than the incumbent, becoming
a lower quality network operator and due to it a weak competitor.29 It is
important to stress that the gap in the infrastructure level is wider as the de-
gree of substitution between networks is lower. As the degree of substitution
decreases, it is more difficult to make profit throughout the infrastructure
level differentiation. As the incumbent can choose first, he tries to main-
tain profits raising his infrastructure level to get a wider gap between his
infrastructure level and the entrant infrastructure level.
The other important result is that the network operators choose the min-
imum infrastructure levels they can. The incumbent chooses first and he
always wants to maintain a gap in the infrastructure level equal to:
uA = uB +
3
σ
(
1
3
− αI
α−1
B
∂uB
∂IB
)
This means that the incumbent wants an infrastructure level such that it
gives the same utility to consumers plus the optimal gap in the infrastructure
levels. This term is just a negative function of the entrant infrastructure
level. As the difference between infrastructure levels damages the entrant
profits, the entrant chooses the minimum amount of infrastructure level he
can. If he chose a higher infrastructure level, given the incumbent reaction,
he would get a lower profit, for the revenues would remain constant and the
costs would raise. This is a very worried result for the social welfare, because
these infrastructure levels are very far from the ideal. As a consequence, the
infrastructure levels should be boosted using any remedy.30
29There is a possibility that the entrant chooses infrastructure level to jump ahead of
the incumbent. That is uB > uA ∀IA = IB sufficiently large, but this possibility should
be ruled out because it is unlikely.
30It is good to point out that the network operators need to be horizontally differentiated
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Once we know how the network operators behave when they cannot build
facilities jointly, we try to know what happens to network operators when
we consider entry and the incumbent and the entrant can build facilities
jointly. Again the maximum infrastructure level, Is, that each network oper-
ator can enjoy from the facilities build jointly is set by a regulator. As in the
other cases, the network operators can build jointly as much as the smallest
infrastructure level chosen by them, Is ≤ min{IA, IB}.
As in the other cases, the regulator will always set Is to the maximum
possible amount, because for the regulator, Is, is just a cost saving factor.
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Given this, the entrant has to solve the following maximization problem:
max
IB
Π∗B =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
s.t. Is = min{IA, IB}
To solve this problem, first we assume that min{IA, IB} = IB, which is
the result in equilibrium, if they play a Stackelberg game. That means that
the entrant maximization problem becomes:
max
IB
Π∗B =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (1− γ)αIαB
We take the derivative with respect to IB:
∂Π∗B
∂IB
=
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− α(1− γ)αIα−1B = 0
With the entrant reaction curve, we can set up the incumbent maximiza-
tion problem:
max
IA
Π∗A =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIB)α
s.t.
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− α(1− γ)αIα−1B = 0
Given these maximization problems, we can get the following result:
because they get higher profits. An example where this has happened is the Spanish mobile
telecommunication industry where the last entrant, Amena, has tried to attract different
groups of consumers from his competitors groups of consumers.
31See the social planner problem in the section where the network operators are sym-
metric and choose simultaneously infrastructure levels.
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Proposition 12 Let network operator be allowed to build jointly facilities
under entry, and let the quantity to be built jointly to be set by a regulator.
Then the entrant chooses the minimum infrastructure level, I, that a network
operator has to supply and the incumbent expands his infrastructure level.
This result tells us that allowing network operators to build jointly facili-
ties is not a good instrument for the entrant to become a tougher competitor.
The incumbent chooses a higher infrastructure level because the marginal
costs of the infrastructure level is lower, while the entrant continues choosing
the minimum infrastructure level he can. The positive aspect is that the
incumbent raises his infrastructure level, which is welfare enhancing.
5.2 Infrastructure level competition: The network op-
erators decide the amount of facilities to be built
jointly
Instead of a regulator, the network operators decide cooperatively by bar-
gaining the amount of facilities they build jointly, which we represent by Is,
after the network operators have decided their infrastructure levels. We are
concerned about how the decision about Is may influence on entry.
The game is the same first game as in the previous sections, of course,
with the difference that the network operators decide their infrastructure
levels sequentially instead of simultaneously.
At the last stage, when the network operators compete in prices, the
equilibrium prices are the same than in the other scenarios studied up to now.
Following backward induction, we continue solving the Bargaining Stage. As
previously, we make use of the Nash Bargaining Solution:
max
Is
ΠβAΠ
1−β
B
s.t. Is ≤ min{IA, IB}, β ∈ (0, 1),
where
ΠA =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
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and
ΠB =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
Note that, up to this stage, we are solving the same problem that when the
network operators decided their infrastructure levels simultaneously. This
means that the solution must be the same, namely Is = min{IA, IB} or
Is = 0. To check so, we solve the first stage of the game where the network
operators choose sequentially their infrastructure levels. We suppose that
min{IA, IB} = IB, which is the more likely result in equilibrium. The entrant
solves:
if Is = 0 Π
∗
B =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
or
if Is = IB Π
∗
B =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
The first order conditions are respectively:
if Is = 0⇒ ∂Π
∗
B
∂IB
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− αIα−1B = 0
and
if Is = IB ⇒ ∂Π
∗
B
∂IB
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− α(1− γ)αIα−1B = 0
The incumbent solves:
max
IA
Π∗A =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
s.t. Is = 0,
∂Π∗B
∂IB
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− αIα−1B = 0
or
s.t. Is = IB,
∂Π∗B
∂IB
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− α(1− γ)αIα−1B = 0
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We can see that the maximization problems are identical to the maxi-
mization problems when Is is decided by a regulator. The only difference
is that now the network operators can also choose Is = 0, the disagreement
point. Looking at the solutions of the problems we have computed before
in this section, we can see that the entrant chooses the minimum amount
of infrastructure level I, under Is = 0 and Is = IB. However, the infras-
tructure level chosen by the incumbent is higher under Is = IB than under
Is = 0. This means that the infrastructure level gap is wider and therefore
the revenue will be higher for the incumbent and lower for the entrant if
Is = IB. The costs are lower for both of them. Then, it is rather clear that
the incumbent always prefers Is = IB to Is = 0, but the entrant only prefers
Is = IB to Is = 0 if σ is sufficiently large. In other words, the entrant prefers
Is = IB if the saved costs are higher than the lost revenues. Given this, we
can conclude:
Proposition 13 Let the network operators decide sequentially their infras-
tructure levels, let them decide cooperatively the amount of facilities they
build and let σ to be sufficiently large. Then, the network operators choose
the same amount of infrastructure level as when the amount of facilities they
build jointly is decided by a regulator.
The regulator and the network operators choose the same if σ is large.
Otherwise, the entrant chooses the disagreement point, Is = 0. In this case,
it is needed the presence of a regulator, because it may happen that the
network operators deviate from what the regulator would do.
About the robustness of this result with respect to the timing of the game,
There may be two possibilities. First, network operators decide cooperatively
the amount of facilities to build jointly and afterwards they choose their
infrastructure level sequentially. Second, the two stages we have described in
the first option are decided simultaneously, but it is very unlikely that these
possibilities may arise in reality.
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed how the possibility of building jointly facilities affects the
network operators decisions on network qualities. We have shown that the
amount of facilities built jointly gives incentives to raise the infrastructure
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levels. In particular, when the network operators have to decide their in-
frastructure levels simultaneously (depending on the timing of the network
operators decisions) both network operators choose higher infrastructure lev-
els, independently of whether the amount to be built is set by a regulator or it
is set cooperatively by the network operators. In this case, the possibility of
building jointly facilities gives the same incentives to network operators and
to the regulator. All of them see it as an infrastructure level cost reduction
that makes ”cheaper” for the network operators to invest in their network
qualities.
When we analyze entry we find different results. If building facilities
jointly is allowed the incumbent improves her infrastructure level and the
entrant keeps choosing the same infrastructure level as if building jointly
was not allowed. This is due to the fact that given any infrastructure level
chosen by the entrant, the incumbent chooses her infrastructure level in such
a way that the only profitable possibility for the entrant is to choose the
lowest infrastructure level. This is so, because the incumbent is the first to
choose the infrastructure level and she profits from his first mover advantage.
The incumbent profits are always higher because he chooses a higher quality
network compared to the entrant. The entrant enjoys lower revenues but at
the same time lower costs. This comes from the fact that she chooses the
cheapest infrastructure level, given that the network operators build jointly
facilities. Thus, depending on the net sum of these two effects, the entrant
may have lower profits. If the entrant has lower profit, she would choose the
disagreement point for the bargaining stage and no facilities would be jointly
built.
It is important to point out that the network operators decide the same
network qualities when they decide first, about their network qualities and
second, about the amount of facilities they build jointly as the quality jointly
built is decided by a regulator. But, if the timing of the network operators is
to decide, first about the amount of facilities they build jointly and second,
about their network quality, the network operators choose very low network
qualities which is very far from the ideal for social welfare.
National Regulatory Boards should allow network operators to build fa-
cilities jointly, but they have to control the timing of the network operators
decisions. In doing so, they force them to build networks with the highest
possible quality. In the case of entry, it may be necessary the presence of
a regulator too. The network operators may decide not to build facilities
jointly. It is interesting to point out that a regulator may be necessary not
29
because the network operators may damage competition using the possibility
of building facilities jointly but because they may decide to build jointly less
than what is required from a social point of view.
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A appendix
A.1 Proof Proposition 1
Assume that min{Ii, Ij} is Ij and Ii > Ij. The social planner asks the
network operator with min{Ii, Ij} for a higher infrastructure level to relax
the constraint s ≤ min{Ii, Ij}, this would allow the network operators to
build jointly more facilities, we would find out a situation where IPj > I
P
i ,
which is a contradiction. Then, the only possible solution is IPj = I
P
i = I
P .
We substitute s = Ii, in the objective function and by taking the deriva-
tive, we obtain that in equilibrium the optimum infrastructure levels hold
the following condition:
Ii ∈ <+ / 1
2
∂ui
∂Ii
− α(1− γ)αIα−1i = 0
A.2 Proof Proposition 2
The proof is straight forward. Note that the marginal costs of the infrastruc-
ture level decreases with Is and the marginal revenues keep constant with
Is. This allows the network operators to choose higher infrastructure levels,
which means a higher level of welfare, because final prices are constant.
A.3 Proof Proposition 3
If Is < Ii, we take the derivative with respect to Is of the first order condition.
This gives us the equilibrium infrastructure level when the network operators
are allowed to build jointly facilities:
∂
∂Is
(
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii
− α(Ii − γIs)α−1) =
=
1
3
∂
∂Is
∂ui
∂Ii
− ∂
∂Is
(α(Ii − γIs)α−1) = αγ(α− 1)(Ii − γIs)α−1 > 0
Therefore the marginal cost of the infrastructure level is lower, the marginal
revenue keeps constant and, thus, in equilibrium, the network operators in-
frastructure levels raise.
If Is = Ii, the network operators profit functions are:
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Π∗i =
1
2σ
+
ui − uj
3
+ σ(
(ui − uj)2
18
)− (1− γ)αIαi
If we take the derivative con respect to Ii to the profit function and we
apply symmetry:
∂Π∗i
∂Ii
=
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii
− α(1− γ)αIα−1i = 0
If we compare this first order condition with the one we obtain when
Is = 0
∂Π∗i
∂Ii
=
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii
− αIα−1i = 0
we see that the marginal revenue keeps constant and the marginal cost is
lower when Is = Ii. Therefore, in equilibrium, the infrastructure levels are
higher under Is = Ii.
A.4 Proof Proposition 4
The social planner optimum infrastructure level satisfies:
1
2
∂ui
∂Ii
− α(1− γ)αIα−1i = 0
and the network operators optimum infrastructure level satisfies:
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii
− α(1− γ)αIα−1i = 0
As far as both marginal costs are identical, the proportion between the
social planner and both network operators optima is the ratio between the
marginal revenues
IP
I∗
=
2
3
where IP is the social planner optimum and I∗ is the network operators
optimum. This means that the network operators always choose lower in-
frastructure levels compared with what a social planner would do. Given
this, as the network operators infrastructure levels raise with Is, as we can
deduce from proposition 3, and therefore, social welfare, the regulator always
chooses the highest possible Is, Is = Ii.
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A.5 Proof Proposition 5
Let Is = IIi and let the equilibrium investments be I
∗
i without building
jointly and I∗∗i when building jointly. Then, the network operators enjoy
higher profits if:
Π∗i − Π∗∗i = (
1
2σ
− (I∗i )α)− (
1
2σ
− (1− γ)αI∗∗i α) ≤ 0⇒
⇒ (1− γ)αI∗∗i α ≤ (I∗i )α
(1− γ)I∗∗i ≤ I∗i
To know if last condition holds, we use the optimality conditions:
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii
|Ii=I∗i = α(I∗i )α−1
and
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii
|Ii=I∗∗i = α(1− γ)α(I∗∗i )α−1
If the condition needed for a higher profit when the network operators
are allowed to build jointly holds, then:
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii
|Ii=I∗∗i = α(1− γ)αI∗∗i α−1 ≤
≤ α(I∗i )α−1 =
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii
|Ii=I∗i ⇒
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii Ii=I∗∗i
≤ 1
3
∂ui
∂Ii Ii=I∗i
As it is known from previous results, I∗i < I
∗∗
i , this together with the fact
that ui is concave yields
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii Ii=I∗∗i
< 1
3
∂ui
∂Ii Ii=I∗i
and therefore Π∗i < Π
∗∗
i .
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A.6 Proof Lemma 1
If we take the derivative with respect to the objective function we obtain:
β
∂ΠA
∂Is
Πβ−1A Π
1−β
B + (1− β)
∂ΠB
∂Is
ΠβAΠ
−β
B
Working out the expression:
β
∂ΠA
∂Is
(
ΠB
ΠA
)(1−β) + (1− β)∂ΠB
∂Is
(
ΠA
ΠB
)β
Notice that this expression is positive, because both derivatives, β, 1− β
and the profit function are positives. Thus, the only possible solution to the
problem is Is = min{IA, IB} or Is = 0.
A.7 Proof Proposition 6
As we have seen in proposition 5, the network operators enjoy higher profits
when they can build jointly facilities. Then, the possibility of Is = 0 is ruled
out. Given this, the problem is identical to the problem we have solved
when a regulator sets the quantity the network operators can build jointly.
Therefore, given that we have two identical problems, we have two identical
solutions.
A.8 Proof Proposition 7
In the game when, first, the network operators decide the amount of facilities
that they build jointly and second, they choose their infrastructure levels, the
equilibrium prices of the last stage are:
pi =
1
σ
+
(ui − uj)
3
i = A,B j 6= i
Following backward induction, the network operators decide non-cooperatively
their infrastructure levels:
max
Ii
Π∗i =
1
2σ
+
(ui − uj)
3
+ σ
(ui − uj)2
18
− (Ii − γIs)α
s.t. Ii ≥ Is
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Given the constraint, we may have two possible solutions, I∗i > Is and
Ii = Is. Our first task is to prove that I
∗
i > Is is not part of a SPNE. If it
were part of it, the network operators would solve:
max
Is
B = ΠβAΠ
1−β
B
s.t. ΠA =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
and
ΠB =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
The first order condition of the bargaining problem is:
∂B
∂Is
= β
∂ΠA
∂Is
(
ΠB
ΠA
)1−β + (1− β)∂ΠB
∂Is
(
ΠA
ΠB
)β > 0
This implies that, in equilibrium, Is = I
∗
i , which is a contradiction. As
we have seen previously, the equilibrium must be symmetric. Is = I
∗
i for i =
A,B. If we bring this result to the bargaining problem, we get:
max
Is
B = ΠβAΠ
1−β
B
s.t. ΠA =
1
2σ
− (1− γ)αIαs
and
ΠB =
1
2σ
− (1− γ)αIαs
The first order condition of the problem is:
∂B
∂Is
= β
∂ΠA
∂Is
(
ΠB
ΠA
)1−β + (1− β)∂ΠB
∂Is
(
ΠA
ΠB
)β < 0
In equilibrium, the network operators infrastructure levels are I∗A = I
∗
B =
I. Moreover, the network operators build all the facilities jointly.
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For the second game, where the network operators decide simultaneously
the amount of facilities they build jointly and their infrastructure levels, the
equilibrium prices of the last stage are:
pi =
1
σ
+
(ui − uj)
3
for i = A,B and j 6= i
We solve the second stage. We start solving the problem where the net-
work operators decide cooperatively the amount they build jointly:
max
Is
B = ΠβAΠ
1−β
B
s.t. Is ≤ min{IA, IB}, β ∈ (0, 1)
where
ΠA =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
and
ΠB =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
The first order condition is:
∂B
∂Is
= β(
ΠB
ΠA
)1−β
∂ΠA
∂Is
+ (1− β)(ΠA
ΠB
)β
∂ΠB
∂Is
As
∂ΠA
∂Is
= αγ(IA − γIs)α−1 > 0
and
∂ΠB
∂Is
= αγ(IB − γIs)α−1 > 0
The solution is Is = min{IA, IB}. Therefore, the network operators solve
these problems in order to know their infrastructure levels:
max
Ii
Π∗i =
1
2σ
+
(ui − uj)
3
+ σ
(ui − uj)2
18
− (1− γ)αIαi
In equilibrium, the following first order conditions hold:
1
3
∂ui
∂Ii
− α(1− γ)αIα−1i = 0
Then, the solution to this second game coincidence with the solution to
the former game in the paper.
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A.9 Proof Lemma 2
As uA > uB ∀IA = IB and ui = 0 if Ii = 0 and concavity of uA and uB imply
∂uA
∂IA
> ∂uB
∂IB
. If we work out the first order conditions, we obtain:
1
3
+
σ
9
(uA − uB) = αI
α−1
A
∂uA
∂IA
1
3
+
σ
9
(uB − uA) = αI
α−1
B
∂uB
∂IB
If we subtract the second equation to the first one:
2σ
9
(uA − uB) = αI
α−1
A
∂uA
∂IA
− αI
α−1
B
∂uB
∂IB
and finally:
αIα−1A
∂uA
∂IA
=
αIα−1B
∂uB
∂IB
+
2σ
9
(uA − uB)
From this equation and from the conditions uA > uB,
∂uA
∂IA
> ∂uB
∂IB
and the
characteristics of the cost functions, we can conclude that in equilibrium, the
network operator A infrastructure level is higher, I∗A > I
∗
B.
A.10 Proof Proposition 8
The regulator always chooses Is = IB. Given this, the derivative with respect
to Is of the network operator A first order condition of the profit maximiza-
tion problem is:
∂
∂IB
∂Π∗A
∂IA
= α(α− 1)γ(IA − γIB)(α−2) > 0
To know how the first order condition changes when Is = Ii respect to
the case when Is = 0, we subtract one to the other one:
∂Π∗B
∂IB
(Is = IB)−∂Π
∗
B
∂IB
(Is = 0) = αI
α−1
B −α(1−γ)αIα−1B > 0⇒ 1−(1−γ)α > 0
which is true because γ < 1 and α > 1. Therefore, as both first order
conditions shift upwards, both infrastructure levels are higher, I∗∗i (Is = IB) >
I∗i (Is = 0), i = A,B.
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A.11 Proof Proposition 9
We know that Is = IB. Recall the first order conditions:
1
3
∂uA
∂IA
+
σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uA
∂IA
= α(IA − γIB)α−1
and
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
+
σ
9
(uB − uA)∂uB
∂IB
= α(1− γ)αIα−1B
If we work out the expression, we obtain that in equilibrium:
I∗∗A = (
1
3
∂uA
∂IA
+ σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uA∂IA
α
)|
1
(α−1)
IA=I
∗∗
A
+ γI∗∗B
I∗∗B = (
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
+ σ
9
(uB − uA)∂uB∂IB
α(1− γ)α )|
1
(α−1)
IB=I
∗∗
B
If we subtract the second to the first equation and we work out the ex-
pression:
I∗∗A − I∗∗B > I∗A + γI∗∗B − I∗∗B −
1− (1− γ) αα−1
(1− γ) αα−1 I
∗∗
B = I
∗
A − I∗B
where I∗A and I
∗
B are the network operator A and B infrastructure levels
when they are not allowed to build jointly facilities. Therefore, as α ≥ 2
I∗∗A (Is = IB)− I∗∗B (Is = IB) < I∗A(Is = 0)− I∗∗B (Is = 0)
A.12 Proof Proposition 10
From proposition 9, we know that I∗A − I∗B > I∗∗A − I∗∗B ∀α ≥ 2. This implies
that (uA−uB)|Is=0 = u∗A−u∗B > (uA−uB)|Is=IB = u∗∗A −u∗∗B . This means that
the network operator A revenues decreases and the network operator B in-
creases. At the same time, both network operators enjoy lower infrastructure
level costs. Then, it is clear that the network operator B gets higher profits
under Is = IB. Therefore, he never chooses the disagreement point, Is = 0.
The network operator also gets higher profits, because the cost reduction is
higher than the revenue reduction. This is so because the cost function is
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convex and the utility function is concave. Concavity of the utility function
implies that, given the difference in the infrastructure levels when Is = 0 and
when Is = IB, although the infrastructure level gap is narrower, the revenue
reduction is very small, because the marginal utility is decreasing. Moreover,
the utility function does not change with Is. On the other hand, as the cost
function is convex, the marginal cost is increasing and the cost reduction
Is = IB has a big impact in the costs because they are very much reduced,
much more than the revenues.
A.13 Proof Proposition 11
Network operators problems when they decide non-cooperatively their in-
frastructure levels are, respectively:
max
IA
Π∗A =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
s.t. IA ≥ Is, uA > uB ∀IA = IB
and
max
IB
Π∗B =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
s.t. IB ≥ Is uA > uB ∀IA = IB
Given the constraints, we have two possible solutions, I∗B > Is and I
∗
B =
Is. IA is always higher than IB because uA > uB ∀IA = IB. First, we suppose
that, in equilibrium, I∗i > Is. Then, the network operators solve:
max
Is
B = ΠβAΠ
1−β
B
s.t. ΠA =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
ΠB =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
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uA > uB ∀IA = IB
The first order condition of the problem is:
∂B
∂Is
= β
∂ΠA
∂Is
(
ΠB
ΠA
)1−β + (1− β)∂ΠB
∂Is
(
ΠA
ΠB
)β > 0
This implies that, in equilibrium I∗B = Is, which is a contradiction. Next,
we see what happens when IB = Is. First, we check the level of investment
chosen by the network operator A. This comes from the following expression:
∂Π∗A
∂IA
=
1
3
∂uA
∂IA
+
σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uA
∂IA
− α(IA − γIs)α−1 = 0
We also need to know about the bargaining problem:
max
Is
B = ΠβAΠ
1−β
B
s.t. ΠA =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB(Is))
3
+ σ
(uA − uB(Is))2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
and
ΠB =
1
2σ
+
(uB(Is)− uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB(Is))2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
If we take the first order conditions, we obtain:
∂ΠA
∂Is
= β
∂ΠA
∂Is
(
ΠB
ΠA
)1−β + (1− β)∂ΠB
∂Is
(
ΠA
ΠB
)β = 0
where
∂ΠA
∂Is
= −1
3
uB(Is)
∂Is
− σ
9
(uA − uB(Is))∂uB(Is)
∂Is
+ (IA − γIs)α−1
This expression has got only a positive term. This means that the network
operator A wants Is very low and it may be so low that it could be lower than
the minimum requirement. The network operator B wants Is as high as it is
possible. When the timing of the game is, first the network operators decide
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IA, IB and, second, they bargain over Is, as β ∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium I∗∗B is
lower than in the game where first network operators decide IA and IB and
second, they bargain over Is. If we plug this result in the network operator
A first order condition we can see that the network operator A infrastructure
level, I∗∗A , is also lower than in the game with different timing.
Assume that network operators decide simultaneously about the amount
of facilities they build jointly, Is and the infrastructure levels, IA and IB.
We solve the second stage. We start solving the problem where the network
operators decide cooperatively the amount they build jointly:
max
Is
B = ΠβAΠ
1−β
B
s.t. Is ≤ min{IA, IB}, β ∈ (0, 1) and uA > uB ∀IA = IB
where
ΠA =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIs)α
and
ΠB =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IB − γIs)α
The first order condition is:
∂B
∂Is
= β(
ΠB
ΠA
)1−β
∂ΠA
∂Is
+ (1− β)(ΠA
ΠB
)β
∂ΠB
∂Is
As
∂ΠA
∂Is
= αγ(IA − γIs)α−1 > 0
and
∂ΠB
∂Is
= αγ(IB − γIs)α−1 > 0
The solution is Is = min{IA, IB}. Therefore, the network operators solve
these problems in order to know their infrastructure levels. For the network
operator B:
43
max
IB
Π∗B =
1
2σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (1− γ)αIαB
In equilibrium, the following first order holds:
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− α(1− γ)αIα−1B = 0
For the network operator A:
max
IA
Π∗A =
1
2σ
+
(uA − uB)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (IA − γIB)α
In equilibrium, the following first order holds:
1
3
∂uA
∂IA
+
σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uA
∂IA
− α(IA − γIB)α−1 = 0
Then, the solution to this second game coincidence with the former game
in the paper.
A.14 Proof Lemma 3
If we take the incumbent maximization problem constraint and we work it
out we obtain:
uA − uB = (1
3
− αI
α−1
B
∂uB
∂IB
)
9
σ
If we substitute the expression in the incumbent maximization problem:
max
IA
1
2σ
+ (
1
3
− αI
α−1
B
∂uB
∂IB
)
3
σ
+ (
1
3
− αI
α−1
B
∂uB
∂IB
)2
9
2σ
− IαA
We take the first order condition and we see that is negative:
∂
∂IA
= −αIα−1A < 0
The incumbent chooses the quantity that holds his constraint. We have
multiple equilibria. Any pair (IA, IB) that satisfies the incumbent constraint
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is an equilibrium. If we check the restriction it is easy to see that the incum-
bent always chooses a higher infrastructure level than the entrant. Given
the multiple equilibria, the more likely equilibrium is the one where the en-
trant chooses the minimum infrastructure level that network operators have
to supply. This is because, in this equilibrium, both network operators are
better off. Given the entrant investment, the incumbent chooses the invest-
ment that comes out from its maximization constraint and it is easy to see
that is higher than the entrant infrastructure level.
A.15 Proof Proposition 12
If we work out the incumbent maximization problem constraint, we obtain:
(uA − uB) = (1
3
− α(1− γ)
αIα−1B
∂uB
∂IB
)
9
σ
If we substitute this expression in the incumbent objective function, the
maximization problem becomes:
max
IA
1
2σ
+ (
1
3
− α(1− γ)
αIα−1B
∂uB
∂IB
)
3
σ
+ (
1
3
− α(1− γ)
αIα−1B
∂uB
∂IB
)2
9
2σ
− (IA − γIB)α
If we take the first order condition we see that is negative:
∂
∂IA
= −α(IA − γIB)α−1 < 0
The incumbent chooses the least possible quantity that holds its con-
straint. Again, we have multiple equilibria, any pair (IA, IB) that holds the
incumbent constraint is an equilibrium and if we check the restriction it is
easy to see that the incumbent always chooses a higher infrastructure level
more than the entrant. Given the multiple equilibria, the more likely equi-
librium is the one where the entrant chooses the minimum investment level
that network operators have to supply. This is because in this equilibrium
both network operators are better off. So the entrant repeats the same invest-
ment than when building jointly was not allowed. The incumbent investment
comes out again from its maximization constraints and it is higher. We prove
it just comparing the constraint under Is = 0 and Is = IB.
If Is = 0, then
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− αIα−1B = 0
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if Is = IB then
1
3
∂uB
∂IB
− σ
9
(uA − uB)∂uB
∂IB
− α(1− γ)αIα−1B = 0
If we subtract the first equation to the second equation, we obtain:
α(1− γ)αIα−1B − αIα−1B ⇒ (1− γ)α − 1 < 0
Therefore, the constraint is relaxed and that allows the incumbent to
choose a higher infrastructure level.
A.16 Proof Proposition 13
When Is = 0, the network operator B profit function is:
Π∗B(Is = 0) =
1
σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− IαB
and when Is = IB, the network operator B profit function is:
Π∗B(Is = IB) =
1
σ
+
(uB − uA)
3
+ σ
(uA − uB)2
18
− (1− γ)αIαB
In equilibrium, I∗B(Is = 0) = I
∗∗
B = I. On the contrary, the network
operator A chooses higher infrastructure level under Is = IB than under
Is = 0. This implies that (uA − uB)|Is=0 = u∗A − u∗B < (uA − uB)|Is=IB =
u∗∗A − u∗∗B , because the infrastructure level gap is wider when Is = IB. If we
compare the profit under Is = 0 and Is = IB, we see that:
Π∗B(Is = IB)− Π∗B(Is = 0) = (
1
2σ
+
u∗B − u∗A
3
+ σ
(u∗B − u∗A)2
18
− Iα)−
−( 1
2σ
+
u∗B − u∗A
3
+ σ
(u∗B − u∗A)2
18
− (1− γ)αIα) =
= σ(
(u∗∗A − u∗∗B )2
18
− (u
∗
A − u∗B)2
18
) + (1− (1− γ)α)Iα−
−((u
∗∗
A − u∗∗B )
3
− (u
∗
A − u∗B)
3
)
If we want Π∗B(Is = IB) − Π∗B(Is = 0) to be positive, we need σ to be
sufficiently large to overcome the negative term (
(u∗∗A −u∗∗B )
3
− (u∗A−u∗B)
3
).
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